In light of the recent exchange of views between our governments, I think it would be useful to make the following statement on the position of Her Majesty`s Government in the United Kingdom with regard to Czechoslovakia. These are the characteristics that I would like to highlight here and which have constituted an immeasurable trust that Britain and France pay dearly. Over these five years, we have been reduced to a security position so overwhelming and unassailable that we have never been careful to think about it. We were lowered from a position where the word “war” was considered a word that could only be used by people eligible for a mad asylum. We have been removed from a position of security and power – the power to do good, the power to be generous to a defeated enemy, the power to settle with Germany, the power to give it the right reparation for its abuses, stop power, its armament, if we decide to make the power to take every step in strength or mercy or justice that we thought was right – in five years from a position that is safe undisputed of who we are today. The agreement was widely welcomed. French Prime Minister Daladier did not believe, as one scholar put it, that a European war was justified “to keep three million Germans under Czech sovereignty.” But the same is true for Alsace-Lorraine, unlike the alliance between France and Czechoslovakia against German aggression. Gallup Polls, in Britain, France and the United States, said the majority of the population supported the agreement. In 1939, Czechoslovakian President Beneé was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize.
 The New York Times headline on the Munich accord was: “Hitler receives less than his claims from the Sudetenland” and reports that a “joyful crowd” had applauded Daladier on his return to France and that Chamberlain had been “savagely applauded” upon his return to the United Kingdom.  Meanwhile, the British government has asked Benea to request a mediator. As he did not want to sever his government`s relations with Western Europe, the heirs reluctantly agreed. The British appointed Lord Runciman, the former Liberal cabinet minister, who arrived in Prague on 3 August to convince Benes to accept an acceptable plan for the Sudeten Germans.  On 20 July, Bonnet informed the Czechoslovakian ambassador in Paris that France, while publicly declaring its support for the Czechoslovakian negotiations, was not prepared to go to war on the Sudetenland.  In August, the German press was full of stories of Czechoslovakian atrocities against the Sudeten Germans, with the intention of forcing the West to put pressure on the Czechoslovakians to make concessions.  Hitler hoped that the Czechoslovaks would refuse and that the West would feel morally justified in abandoning the Czechoslovaks to their fate.  In August, Germany sent 750,000 troops along the border with Czechoslovakia, officially as part of military maneuvers.   On September 4 or 5, Erbe presented the fourth plan, which met almost all of the requirements of the agreement.
The Sudeten Germans were invited by Hitler to the prairies to avoid compromise, and the SdP organized demonstrations which, on 7 September, provoked a police operation in Ostrava, during which two of its deputies were arrested.  The Sudeten Germans used the incident and the false allegations of other atrocities as a pretext to interrupt further negotiations.   Later in the meeting, a pre-arranged deception was made to influence and pressure Chamberlain: one of Hitler`s accomplices entered the room to inform Hitler of other Germans killed in Czechoslovakia, and Hitler then shouted: “I will avenge each of them.